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Abstract
This paper explores the influence of the ESG disclosure regulation (government corpo-
rate ESG disclosure and non-government corporate ESG disclosure) on the ranking in 
50 largest economies. Applying various statistical methods and techniques, including 
both parametrical (Student’s t-test, ANOVA analysis) and non-parametrical (Mann-
Whitney U test) tests, simple average analysis, OLS with dummy variables method and 
multiple linear regression analysis, as well as correlation analysis and Granger causality 
test, several hypotheses are tested. The hypotheses stipulate whether or not ESG disclo-
sure regulation differs in developed and emerging countries and whether or not ESG 
disclosure regulation influences the country’s SDGI ranking, as well as the ranking 
of the country among 50 largest economies. According to the results, the differences 
in ESG disclosure regulation are statistically significant in developed and emerging 
countries. The level of ESG disclosure compliance is higher in developed countries. 
ESG disclosure regulation influences the position of the country in SDGI and 50 larg-
est economies rankings. The more country complies with ESG disclosure criteria, the 
better position in rankings is. Incorporation of ESG criteria is an important evolution-
ary step in economic development of the country. It allows increasing position of the 
country in 50 largest economies and SDGI ranking. Thus, ESG disclosure regulation is 
vital for the development of the country in the modern world.
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INTRODUCTION
The introduction of 17 UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) 
and their 169 targets and 230 indicators at the 2015 New York Summit 
was an important step forward for humanity towards sustainable de-
velopment. By 2030, they set key benchmarks and indicators at the 
global level for poverty reduction, gender equality, and education for 
all, the well-being and health of humankind, sustainable economic, 
urban, and infrastructure development, and the preservation of the 
environment and all resources. The development of tools to achieve 
these benchmarks lies in the coordination of national efforts (in the 
form of roadmaps for SDGs of each country and progress reports) and 
global multi-stakeholder partnerships, regardless of the status of a de-
veloped or developing country.
One of the tools for achieving the SDGs is to strengthen the regulatory 
requirements for the disclosure of information by companies on envi-
ronmental (E), social (S), and governance (G) (ESG) criteria. Ensuring 
the transparency of the business environment and reporting on the 
incorporation of CSR into the activities of companies is the key to 
effective monitoring of progress in achieving SDGs in the corporate 
sector.
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The last decade has been marked by the dynamic development of regulatory disclosure tools based 
on ESG criteria and SDGs. More than 300 of such instruments, governmental and non-governmental, 
mandatory and voluntary, have been introduced in 50 largest countries by GDP (both developed and 
developing (UNPRI, 2016b).
The study of the experience of the world’s 50 largest economies shows the significant attention of regu-
lators in these countries to the formation of national regulation of ESG disclosure according to SDGs.
Ukraine’s adoption of a national SDGs target system in 2017 unites it with the global community. 
However, the level of SDGs progress in our country compared to 50 leading countries in the world is 
low – 46th place out of 149 countries in 2016 Global SDG Indicators Database (SDG Indicators, 2016). 
Approval of Decree of the president of Ukraine No. 722/2019 from 30/09/2019 “About the Sustainable 
Development Goals of Ukraine for the period up to 2030,” Order of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine 
“On approval of the Concept for the implementation of state policy in the field of promoting the develop-
ment of socially responsible business in Ukraine for the period up to 2030” and Decree of the President 
of Ukraine No. 722/2019 from 30/09/2019 “About the Sustainable Development Strategy “Ukraine – 
2020” remain a minimal step on Ukraine’s path to the SDGs.
Therefore, the study of the impact of regulatory tools for ESG disclosure in the largest world economies 
and the level of achievement of the SDGs by them is an important scientific and applied task. To see 
whether or not there are differences in ESG disclosure regulation in developed and emerging countries 
and whether or not ESG disclosure regulation influence SDGI ranking and position in 50 largest econ-
omies ranking the following hypotheses are tested in this study:
H1: The level of ESG disclosure compliance is higher in developed countries. 
H2: SDGI ranking of the country is influenced by ESG disclosure regulation.
H3: ESG disclosure regulation influences the ranking of the country among 50 largest economies.
H4: ESG disclosure regulation influence on SDGI ranking is different for government and non-govern-
ment disclosure.
1. LITERATURE REVIEW
ESG and SDGs information disclosure and its reg-
ulation have a short history in the works of sci-
entists given their dissemination since 2015 at the 
global level. Since then, SDGs have been studied 
mainly in the context of investor decision-making 
for responsible investment and benchmarking in 
financial markets, taking into account general-
ly accepted guidelines in the field of sustainable 
development.
Thus, Trabacchi and Buchner (2019) provide evi-
dence in SDG-informed capital allocation deci-
sion-making for investors and valuable instru-
ments for investing capital into activities support-
ing the SDGs.
Leleux and van der Kaaij (2019) describe the con-
nection between SDGs and ESG ratings and how 
stock markets evaluate the latter.
On the level of individual companies, ESG dis-
closure regulation and SDGs were investigated by 
Indahl and Jacobsen (2019). They describe Nordic 
private equity firm, Summa Equity, which re-
ceived the ESG award at the 2019 Private Equity 
Awards in London. This firm uses SDGs and ESG 
for communication with stakeholders and empha-
sizes its fundamental role in value creation poten-
tial, social benefits, risk mitigation for PE.
On the country level, ESG disclosure regulation and 
SDGs were investigated by Bala (2018) in the context 
of various regulatory frameworks of Bangladesh.
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Phan, De Luca, and Iaia (2020) found a positive 
experience of disclosing non-financial informa-
tion according to some of the SDGs matters in the 
Italian context. The study of 111 Italian listed com-
panies that issued their non-financial (ESG) dis-
closure shows that larger companies and/or com-
panies with higher risk profiles (Beta) have already 
started to improve their disclosure.
The approaches to ESG disclosure in the United 
States and six other countries (South Africa, Brazil, 
the European Union, the United Kingdom, Hong 
Kong, and mainland China) were investigated by 
Ho and Park, (2019). They argue “that optimal ap-
proaches for improving the quality and utility of 
non-financial information must draw on the com-
parative advantages of both public and private forms 
of disclosure regulation” (Ho & Park, 2020, p. 250).
In the EU, in Communication from the Commission 
– Guidelines on Non-Financial Reporting (meth-
odology for reporting non-financial information) 
C/2017/4234 17 UN SDGs – are cited as one of 
the important methodologies for preparing such 
reports alongside the widely accepted standards 
of the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) and the 
International Council on Integrated Reporting 
(IIRC). 
The latter organization recommends structuring 
the disclosure of information by companies in 
terms of 6 types of capital used by it – financial, 
manufactured, intellectual, human, social, and 
natural. One cannot disagree with the opinion 
of Adams (2017) on the suitability of these types 
of capital for some or a complete set of SDGs. 
This compliance significantly improves the qual-
ity of information disclosure by companies in 
terms of sustainable development and ESG cri-
teria (Table 1).




Manufactured 10 (2, 4, 6, 7, 9, 11-14, 17)
Intellectual 9 (3, 6, 7,10, 12-14, 16, 17)
Human 12 (3-7, 8, 10, 12-14, 16, 17)
Social 17 (1-17)
Natural 9 (2, 6, 7, 11-14, 16, 17)
Adams (2020) emphasizes the importance of pro-
moting Sustainable Development Goal Disclosure 
(SDGD) Recommendations agreed by the most 
reputable accounting organizations, standards 
such as:
• The Association of Chartered Certified 
Accountants (ACCA), 
• Chartered Accountants ANZ, 
• the Institute of Chartered Accountants of 
Scotland (ICAS) 
• the International Federation of Accountants 
(IFAC), 
• the International Integrated Reporting 
Council (IIRC) 
• the World Benchmarking Alliance (WBA). 
Thus, the attention to the SDGs as a basis for 
the presentation of information on ESG crite-
ria is growing both in academia and at the lev-
el of international organizations for accounting 
standardization.
At the same time, in the analyzed works, the au-
thors focus on the role of SDGs mostly as a basis 
for decision-making by investors or information 
disclosure. Moreover, the level of research based 
on this is individual – at the level of investors or 
companies that integrate SDGs into their business 
strategy and responsible behavior. Studies of the 
relationship between the national levels are poor-
ly understood. The current work is a continua-
tion of our previous research on ESG disclosure 
regulation relationship with the countries’ com-
petitiveness (Plastun, Makarenko, Kravchenko, 
Ovcharova, & Oleksich, 2019). There are two types 
of ESG disclosure regulation: government and 
non-government.
The dominant drivers of ESG disclosure promo-
tion are government disclosure requirements. 
Non-government disclosure requirements, in 
particular exchange requirements, are clearly the 
next step in regulating such disclosure. Among 20 
countries with the highest SDGs score, mandato-
ry or voluntary government or non-government 
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regulations for ESG disclosure were introduced 
(Table 2).
In this context, the main question needs to be an-
swered – does ESG disclosure regulation affect 
progress towards the SDGs, what type of regula-
tion, in what way, and in which countries (devel-
oped or developing). The answer to this question 
gives an idea of the future ways to standardize 
the ESG disclosure of information, increase the 
transparency of the business environment to en-
sure progress in achieving SDGs, particularly in 
Ukraine.
2. DATA AND METHODOLOGY
ESG disclosure data by countries are used in the 
following dimensions: government corporate ESG 
disclosure and non-government corporate ESG 
disclosure (the source of information is UNPRI, 
2016a,b,c). SDGI rank and SDGI score are tak-
en from Global SDG Indicators Database (SDG 
Indicators, 2016). The data source for the informa-
tion about the ranking in 50 largest economies is 
UNPRI (2016c). The period of the analysis is 2016 
(the latest available period with data for all analyz-
ed indicators). Data are summarized in Table A1.
Table 2. Countries with the biggest progress in achieving SDGs and their share of ESG disclosure in 
annual company reports in 2016–2017
Source: Compiled by the authors from KPMG (2017), UNPRI (2016a,c), SDG Indicators (2016). 
Country SDGI_Rank SDGI_Score % of ESG disclosed CSR reports
ESG disclosure drivers
Government Non-government(stock exchange)
Sweden 1 84.53 88.0 MandatoryVoluntary –
Denmark 2 83.88 94.0 MandatoryVoluntary Mandatory
Norway 3 82.31 89.0 MandatoryVoluntary –
Finland 4 81.00 82.0 MandatoryVoluntary –
Switzerland 5 80.87 82.0 MandatoryVoluntary Mandatory
Germany 6 80.52 73.0 MandatoryVoluntary Voluntary
Austria 7 79.07 62.0 MandatoryVoluntary –
Netherlands 8 78.94 82.0 MandatoryVoluntary –
Iceland 9 78.41 – Voluntary –
United Kingdom 10 78.14 99.0 MandatoryVoluntary Voluntary
France 11 77.90 94.0 Mandatory –
Belgium 12 77.43 62.0 Mandatory
Canada 13 76.85 84.0 MandatoryVoluntary Mandatory
Ireland 14 76.75 78.0 Mandatory –
Czech Republic 15 76.73 51.0 Voluntary –
Luxembourg 16 76.66 59.0 Mandatory
Slovenia 17 76.62 Mandatory
Japan 18 74.96 99.0 Mandatory Voluntary –
Singapore 19 74.61 84.0 Mandatory Voluntary
Mandatory  
Voluntary
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To see whether or not ESG disclosure regulation 
differs in developed and emerging countries and 
whether or not ESG disclosure regulation in-
fluence SDGI ranking and position in 50 largest 
economies ranking, several hypotheses are tested 
in this study:
H1: The level of ESG disclosure compliance is 
higher in developed countries. 
H2: SDGI ranking of the country is influenced by 
ESG disclosure regulation.
H3: ESG disclosure regulation influences the 
ranking of the country among 50 largest 
economies.
H4: ESG disclosure regulation influence on SDGI 
ranking is different for government and 
non-government disclosure.
To test these hypotheses, both parametrical and 
non-parametrical tests are used to incorporate pos-
sible compliance/incompliance of the data to the 
normal distribution. For these purpose, the fol-
lowing tests are used: parametrical (Student’s t-test, 
ANOVA analysis) and non-parametrical (Mann-
Whitney U test). Simple average analysis and OLS 
with dummy variables method are used as addition-
al techniques to avoid possible methodological bias. 
The initial data set is divided into the following 
sub-sets: data for developed countries and data for 
emerging countries.
The average analysis approach is used to obtain 
preliminary evidence in favor of differences be-
tween analyzed data sets in different dimensions: 
ESG disclosure regulation, SDGI, and 50 largest 
economies rankings. 
The use of parametric and non-parametric tests 
allows seeing whether or not differences between 
analyzed data sets are statistically significant. 
To get additional evidence, multiple regressions 
with a dummy variable are used:
0 1 ,i i iY a a D ε= + +  (1)
where Yi – the value of ESG criterion for developed 
country i; a0 – mean ESG criterion value for the 
developed countries; a1 – a slope for the dummy 
variable Di; Di – a dummy variable for the emerg-
ing countries, equal to 1 for the case of data values 
from emerging countries and 0 if data values do 
not correspond to the emerging countries; εi – er-
ror for the case i.
In favor of difference between analyzed data sets 
evidence the size, sign and statistical significance 
of the dummy coefficients, correlation analysis, 
Granger causality test, and multiple regression 
analysis are used to test Hypotheses 2-4.
3. RESULTS
Let us start with H1: The level of ESG disclosure 
compliance is higher in developed countries. 
Average analysis provides clear evidence in favor 
of higher ESG disclosure compliance in developed 
countries (Appendix B). 
To find whether or not these differences are sta-
tistically significant, several statistical tests are 
performed. OLS with dummy variables method 
is used as an additional technique. Overall results 
are presented in Appendix C. Overview of these 
results is provided in Table 3. 
Table 3. Overview of the empirical results for H1
   Parameter











SDGI rank 2016 + + + + +
SDGI score 2016 + + + + +
Government corporate ESG 
disclosure + + + + +
Non-government corporate ESG 
disclosure + – + + +
Note: “+” – difference between developed countries and emerging countries data sets is detected; “–” – difference between 
developed countries and emerging countries data sets is not detected.
236
Problems and Perspectives in Management, Volume 18, Issue 2, 2020
http://dx.doi.org/10.21511/ppm.18(2).2020.20
As can be seen, the level of ESG disclosure compli-
ance is different in developed and emerging coun-
tries. In general, it is higher in developed coun-
tries. Hypothesis 1 is accepted.
Next, hypotheses H2-H4 are tested. The authors start 
with the correlation analysis to find evidence that 
ESG disclosure regulation influences SDGI ranking 
and ranking of the country among 50 largest econo-
mies. The results are presented in Appendix D.
Overall, there is no stable correlation between ESG 
disclosure regulation and SDGI ranking or rank-
ing of the country among 50 largest economies. 
However, there are a few exceptions. For example, 
for the case of all data sets, there is a rather strong 
positive relationship between government corpo-
rate ESG disclosure and SDGI ranking. Overall, it 
looks like SDGI ranking and ranking of the coun-
try among 50 largest economies are not influenced 
by ESG disclosure regulation.
Next, the Granger causality test is performed (see 
Appendix E). The overview of the Granger causal-
ity test results is presented in Table 4. 
These findings confirm the results of correlation 
analysis: causalities between ESG criteria and ana-
lyzed indicators (both 50 largest economies and 
SDGI rankings) are not detected. Usually, param-
eter Rank acts as the dependent variable. This is in-
direct evidence in favor of H2: SDGI ranking of the 
country is influenced by ESG disclosure regulation.
Next, hypotheses H2 and H4 are tested. For these 
purpose, multiple regression analysis is used. The 
results for the models with SDGI score as the de-
pendent variable and ESG criteria as independent 
variables are summarized in Table 5.
Table 5. Multiple regression analysis: SDGI score 
(Y) and ESG disclosure regulation (X)
































F-test 8.28 0.51 4.63
Multiple R 0.51 0.23 0.51
Models for all data set and for the case of emerg-
ing countries are statistically significant. Non-
government corporate ESG disclosure has p < 0.05 
in both cases.
Based on these results, the models with non-gov-
ernment corporate ESG disclosure as an inde-
pendent variable were developed (Table 6).
As can be seen, F criterion increase in both cases, 
so the overall quality of these models is higher. 
These results clearly show that the use of non-gov-
ernment corporate ESG disclosure influences 
SDGI score – the more ESG criteria are satisfied, 
there higher the score is. It should be mentioned 
that this rule works much better for the case of 
emerging countries.















Ranking in 50 largest economies (X) ND – – – –
SDGI_Rank 2016 (X) – ND ND
SDGI_Score_2016 (X) – ND ND
Government corporate ESG disclosure (X) – – – ND –
Non-government corporate ESG 
disclosure (X) + – – – ND
Note: “+” – statistically significant dependence between X and Y variables is detected; “–” – statistically significant dependence 
between X and Y variables is not detected.
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On the final stage, H3 is tested. The following mul-
tiple regression model is run: ranking in 50 largest 
economies as dependent variable and ESG crite-
ria and SDGI ranking as independent variables 
(Table 7).
As can be seen in the case of ESG criteria and 
SDGI ranking as independent variables, there are 
no suitable linear models. Thus, multiple regres-
sion analysis is run with only ESG criteria as inde-
pendent variables (Table 8).
The best model (with statistically significant pa-
rameters) is as follows:
1 35.72 7.079 ,iY a= − ⋅  (2)
p-values < 0.05 for all coefficients and F criterion 
exceeds critical value. Multiple R0.49 where Yi – 
is rank in the ranking in 50 largest economies of 
i-th country; a1 – non-government corporate ESG 
disclosure, 
As can be seen (Eq. 2), the more ESG criteria are 
used for disclosure regulation, the higher the 
country’s ranking. Non-government corporate 
ESG disclosure has the biggest influence. 
According to these results, the non-government 
corporate ESG disclosure is a primary object to 
start with if the country wants to incorporate ESG 
disclosure regulation and improve its position in 
the 50 largest economies ranking.
In general, there is evidence in favor of hypoth-
eses H2-H4. ESG disclosure regulation can influ-
ence the position of the country in 50 largest econ-
omies ranking. The more country complies with 
ESG disclosure criteria, the better position in the 
ranking is. 
Table 6. Multiple regression analysis: SDGI score (Y) and non-government corporate ESG disclosure 
regulation (X)












Multiple R 0.51 0.41
Table 7. Multiple regression analysis: ranking in 50 largest economies (Y) and SDGI ranking and ESG 
disclosure regulation (X)
Parameter All data sets Developed countries Emerging countries
a0 –28.55 (0.73) –260.51 (0.23) 36.13 (0.72)
SDGI rank 2016, a1 0.2863 (0.37) 1.1239 (0.28) 0.0082 (0.98)
SDGI score 2016, a2 0.6485 (0.53) 3.7033 (0.16) –0.2627 (0.84)
Government corporate ESG disclosure, a3 –0.1106 (0.93) –1.7597 (0.28) 2.3870 (0.24)
Non-government corporate ESG 
disclosure, a4
–1.4723 (0.46) –5.8441 (0.09) 1.3131 (0.47)
F-test 0.97 2.63 0.49
Multiple R 0.28 0.63 0.27
Table 8. Multiple regression analysis: ranking in 50 largest economies (Y) and ESG disclosure regulation (X)
Parameter All data sets Developed countries Emerging countries
a0 31.31 (0.0.00) 40.49 (0.0.00) 21.73 (0.00)
Government corporate ESG disclosure, a1 –0.9248 (0.43) –1.1907 (0.47) 1.8010 (0.32)
Non-government corporate ESG disclosure, 
a2
–1.7855 (0.37) –7.0236 (0.03) 1.9878 (0.44)
F-test 0.82 3.15 0.75
Multiple R 0.18 0.51 0.23
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CONCLUSION
This paper explores the influence of the ESG disclosure regulation on the ranking of 50 largest economies. 
To do this, several hypotheses are tested: (H1) – the level of ESG disclosure compliance is higher in de-
veloped countries; (H2) – SDGI ranking of the country is influenced by ESG disclosure regulation; (H3) – 
ESG disclosure regulation influences ranking of the country among 50 largest economies; (H4) – ESG dis-
closure regulation influence on SDGI ranking is different for government and non-government disclosure.
Hypotheses are tested using different statistical tests (parametrical and non-parametrical), simple av-
erage analysis, OLS with dummy variables method, correlation analysis, Granger causality test, and 
multiple linear regression analysis.
Based on the results, the following conclusions are obtained: 
1. The level of ESG disclosure compliance is different in developed countries and emerging countries. 
2. ESG disclosure compliance is higher in developed countries.
3. ESG disclosure regulation influences the position of the country in SDGI ranking and 50 largest 
economies. The more country complies with ESG disclosure criteria, the better position in the rank-
ing is. This rule works much better for the case of emerging countries.
The results provide additional evidence in favor of differences in ESG disclosure regulation in developed 
and emerging countries. However, the incorporation of ESG criteria is an important evolutionary step 
in the country’s economic development. It allows increasing the country’s position in 50 largest econo-
mies and SDGI ranking. Thus, ESG disclosure regulation is vital for the development of the country in 
the modern world.
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APPENDIX A











DC DEC DC DEC DC DEC DC DEC DC DEC
20 43 75 67 12 21 4 2 4 0
7 118 79 44 29 47 4 2 3 2
12 52 77 64 25 9 4 2 2 3
13 42 77 67 10 42 7 5 3 2
2 76 84 59 37 2 5 5 2 2
4 91 81 57 44 39 6 2 2 2
11 66 78 61 6 32 4 2 2 2
6 37 81 70 4 46 6 4 2 0
– 110 – 48 34 7 0 0 5 0
14 98 77 54 43 16 4 0 0 2
29 79 72 59 36 26 2 0 0 0
35 54 71 64 8 50 5 2 2 3
18 63 75 62 3 35 2 5 2 0
8 56 79 63 17 15 4 2 2 2
3 141 82 36 28 23 3 2 2 3
34 115 71 46 45 41 3 2 0 2
19 81 75 58 38 49 2 4 3 2
33 95 69 56 14 40 6 2 2 2
1 38 84 70 22 24 6 3 2 2
4 47 80 66 19 13 0 5 3 0
10 85 77 58 5 20 7 2 2 0
23 99 71 54 1 33 2 3 3 2
– 27 – 73 – 11 – 2 – 0
– 55 – 59 – 27 – 3 – 2
– 46 – 63 – 18 – 4 – 2
– 58 – 59 – 31 – 2 – 0
– 65 – 57 – 30 – 0 – 2
– 83 – 53 – 48 – 2 – 2
– 46 – 66 – 50 – 5 – 0
Note: DC is used for developed countries; DEC is used for developing and emerging countries. 
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Table C1. T-test of the differences between developed countries and emerging countries





t-criterion –9.48 9.01 2.89 1.95
Null hypothesis Rejected Rejected Rejected Not rejected
Note: t-critical = 1.96 with level of significance p = 0.95.
Parametric tests: ANOVA
Table C2. ANOVA test of the differences between developed countries and emerging countries







F 75.01 80.89 10.17 4.35
p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.04
Null hypothesis Rejected Rejected Rejected Rejected
Note: F-critical = 4.04 with level of significance p = 0.95.
Mann-Whitney U test
Table C3. Mann-Whitney U test of the differences between developed countries and emerging 
countries







Adjusted H 34.89 34.20 8.32 4.16
d.f. 1 1 1 1
p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.04
Null hypothesis Rejected Rejected Rejected Rejected
Note: Critical value = 3.84 with level of significance p = 0.95.
OLS with dummy variables
Table C4. OLS with dummy variables of the differences between developed countries and emerging 
countries







a0 14.57 (0.00) 76.83 (0.00) 4.09 (0.00) 2.05 (0.00)
a1 56.67 (0.00) –17.74 (0.00) –1.54 (0.00) –0.6338 (0.04)
F-test 75.01 80.89 8.41 5.05
Multiple R 0.78 0.79 0.42 0.03
Null hypothesis Rejected Rejected Rejected Rejected
Note: p-values are in parentheses.
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APPENDIX D. CORRELATION ANALYSIS

















Ranking in 50 largest economies 1 0.24 –0.22 –0.15 –0.10
SDGI_rank 2016 0.24 1 –0.98 –0.50 –0.12
SDGI_score_2016 –0.22 –0.98 1 0.51 0.10
Government corporate ESG disclosure –0.15 –0.50 0.51 1 –0.02
Non-government corporate ESG 
disclosure –0.10 –0.12 0.10 –0.02 1

















Ranking in 50 largest economies 1 –0.06 0.20 –0.16 –0.49
SDGI_rank 2016 –0.06 1 –0.95 –0.16 0.28
SDGI_score_2016 0.20 –0.95 1 0.19 0.14
Government corporate ESG disclosure –0.16 –0.16 0.19 1 0.02
Non-government corporate ESG 
disclosure –0.49 –0.28 0.14 0.02 1


















Ranking in 50 largest economies 1 0.09 –0.10 0.18 0.13
SDGI_rank 2016 0.09 1 –0.96 –0.41 0.31
SDGI_score_2016 –0.10 –0.96 1 0.41 –0.35
Government corporate ESG disclosure 0.18 –0.41 0.41 1 –0.10
Non-government corporate ESG 
disclosure 0.13 0.31 –0.35 –0.10 1
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APPENDIX E. GRANGER CAUSALITY TEST
Table E1. Ranking in 50 largest economies (X) and SDGI rank 2016 (Y)
Res. DF Diff. DF F p-value
Function: Y = f(X)
46 –1 0.85 0.36
Function: X = f(Y)
46 –1 0.60 0.44
Table E2. Ranking in 50 largest economies (X) and SDGI score 2016 (Y)
Res. DF Diff. DF F p-value
Function: Y = f(X)
46 –1 0.50 0.48
Function: X = f(Y)
46 –1 0.39 0.53
Table E3. Ranking in 50 largest economies (X) and government corporate ESG disclosure (Y)
Res. DF Diff. DF F p-value
Function: Y = f(X)
46 –1 0.51 0.48
Function: X = f(Y)
46 –1 2.02 0.16
Table E4. Ranking in 50 largest economies (X) and non-government corporate ESG disclosure (Y)
Res. DF Diff. DF F p-value
Function: Y = f(X)
46 –1 2.46 0.12
Function: X = f(Y)
46 –1 4.00 0.05
Table E5. SDGI rank 2016 (X) and government corporate ESG disclosure (Y)
Res. DF Diff. DF F p-value
Function: Y = f(X)
46 –1 0.02 0.88
Function: X = f(Y)
46 –1 0.64 0.42
Table E6. SDGI rank 2016 (X) and non-government corporate ESG disclosure (Y)
Res. DF Diff. DF F p-value
Function: Y = f(X)
46 –1 0.59 0.45
Function: X = f(Y)
476 –1 0.00 0.99
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Table E7. SDGI score 2016 (X) and government corporate ESG disclosure (Y)
Res. DF Diff. DF F p-value
Function: Y = f(X)
46 –1 0.03 0.87
Function: X = f(Y)
46 –1 1.28 0.26
Table E8. SDGI score 2016 (X) and non-government corporate ESG disclosure (Y)
Res. DF Diff. DF F p-value
Function: Y = f(X)
46 –1 0.45 0.50
Function: X = f(Y)
46 –1 0.007 0.93
Table E9. Government corporate ESG disclosure (X) and non-government corporate ESG disclosure (Y)
Res. DF Diff. DF F p-value
Function: Y = f(X)
46 –1 0.04 0.83
Function: X = f(Y)
46 –1 0.04 0.84
